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  We propose an agent-based computational model defining the following dimen-
sions of structural change—organisation of production, technology of production,
and product on the supply side, and income distribution and consumption patterns
on the demand side—at the microeconomic level. We define ten different parameters
to account for these five dimensions of structural change. Building on existing results
we use a full factorial experimental design (DOE) to analyse the size and significance
the effect of these parameters on output growth. We identify the aspects of structural
change that have the strongest impact. We study the direct and indirect effects of the
factors of structural change, and focus on the role of the interactions among the diffe-
rent factors and different aspects of structural change. We find that some aspects of
structural change—income distribution, changes to production technology and the
emergence of new sectors—play a major role on output growth, while others—
consumption shares, preferences, and the quality of goods—play a rather minor role.
Second, these major factors can radically modify the growth of an economy even
when all other aspects experience no structural change. Third, different aspects of
structural change strongly interact: the effect of a factor that influences a particular
aspect of structural change varies radically for different degrees of structural change
in other aspects. These results on the different aspects of structural change provide a
number of insights on why regions starting from a similar level of output and with
initial small differences grow so differently through time. 
Keywords: Structural change, Long run growth, ABM; DOE.
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The dramatic increase in output and consumption following
the industrial revolution was accompanied by substantial changes
in the structure of the economies involved. Countries of late indus-
trialisation and current transition countries are also experiencing
dramatic changes (Dasgupta and Singh, 2005). Economists usually
refer to structural change as the reshuffling in the share of employ-
ment or value added in the three main sectors: agriculture,
manufacturing and services (Clark, 1940; Fisher, 1939; Dietrich and
Krüger, 2010; Baumol, 2010) which has led to these grand
economic shifts to be described as ''industrialisation'' and
''tertiarisation'' of advanced economies. However, structural
changes encompass more than shifts in labour and value added
from one sector to another; they include complex adjustments in
the structure of production, consumption, labour organisation and
income distribution, which interact in a continuous evolutionary
process. For instance, industrialisation is accompanied by the
concentration of production in large capital intensive firms and
firm size growth (Desmet and Parente, 2009), an increase in the
number of goods available for final consumption (Berg, 2002),
closer involvement of science in technological change (Mokyr,
2002), increased use of capital in agriculture and especially manu-
facturing accompanied by an improvement in the technology
embedded in new machines and overall increases in productivity
(Kuznets, 1973), greater urbanisation usually accompanied by
increased income inequality and changes in social class composi-
tion (McCloskey, 2009), and so on. In other words, industrialisation
leads to transformations of economies and societies. Thus the defi-
nition proposed by Matsuyama, that structural change is
''complementary changes in various aspects of the economy, such
as the sector compositions of output and employment, the organi-
sation of industry, the financial system, income and wealth
distribution, demography, political institutions, and even the
society's value system'' (Matsuyama, 2008).
To be sure, some changes precede income growth, others unfold
as a consequence of income growth, and there are interactions
among the different aspects of structural change. For instance,
changes in the distribution of income are related to changes in
class composition and patterns of consumption. Changes to class
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composition, in their turn, are related to the accumulation of
capital and the different organisation of labour. The accumulation
of capital induces the search of new technologies embedded in
more efficient capital goods, and so on.
Ideally we would like to explain the changes in each aspect of
structural change, their co-evolution and their effect on the direc-
tion of economic growth and on other dimensions of structural
change. We believe that such an investigation is fundamental to
shed light on the determinants and dynamics of long-run growth,
and to derive policy implication that consider different aspect of
economic change. This is especially relevant since traditional
explanations of the relation between structural change and growth
point to opposing dynamics (Matsuyama, 2008): i) exogenous
changes in productivity in the manufacturing sector—which
somehow emerge in the economy—induce labour migration from
agriculture to industry; and ii) an increase of productivity in agri-
culture reduces demand for labour and induces migration to the
manufacturing sector where capital investment—characterised by
higher increases in productivity per unit of investment—spurs
growth; the more investment that is concentrated in manufactu-
ring, the greater manufacturing productivity increases. Both these
mechanisms are plausible. However, taken in their basic version
they do not acknowledge the wide array of ''complementary
changes'' they are conducive to, and which help in solving their
contradiction. We believe that a more accurate explanation should
include the various economic aspects that accompany the transfor-
mation of an economy.
In this paper we heed Matsuyama (2008) definition of structural
change and model complementary changes in various aspects of
the structure of an economy, namely organisation of production,
technology of production, and product on the supply side, and
income distribution and consumption patterns on the demand
side. However, we also follow Saviotti and Gaffard (2008) sugges-
tion and investigate the microeconomic sources of structural
changes. Saviotti and Gaffard (2008, p. 115), in line with
Matsuyama (2008), define structural change as a ''change in the
structure of the economic system, that is, in its components and in
their interactions. Components are [...] particular goods or
services, and other activities and institutions, such as technologies,
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types of knowledge, organisational forms etc.''. However, departing
from Matsuyama (2008), they ask: ''What does it mean for a system
to be in equilibrium when its composition keeps changing due to
the emergence of qualitatively different entities?'' [p. 116].
We take on board these remarks and propose a model of the
microeconomic dynamics of structural change as processes that
never reach equilibrium, because of the continuous changes to the
underlying dimensions of the economy. In order to model these
microeconomic interactions and study the emergent structural
change and aggregate output, we use computational models and
solutions (Colander et al., 2008; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008;
Dosi et al., 2010; Leijonhufvud, 2006; Buchanan, 2009; Delli Gatti
et al., 2010; Dawid and Semmler, 2010).
We propose an agent-based computational model defining the
following dimensions of structural change—organisation of
production, technology of production, and product on the supply
side, and income distribution and consumption patterns on the
demand side—at the microeconomic level. We model their co-
evolution in terms of the interactions among the different agents
on the supply and demand sides, and the changing behaviour
promoted by changes to income and structure. We contribute to
the traditional literature on structural change by accounting for
'complementary changes' and in a micro to macro framework,
which can be treated exhaustively using agent based computa-
tional models.
The model includes two types of firms: capital and final goods
producers. Final goods producers produce goods that satisfy diffe-
rent consumption needs, serving different markets. New markets
emerge as an outcome of firms' investments in innovation.
Consumer goods differ also with respect to their quality. A firm
includes many layers of employees (workers and managers at diffe-
rent levels), with each layer earning a different wage. This creates
consumers with unequal income distribution. Consumers are
grouped into classes that demand different varieties of goods, affec-
ting firm demand. Among other things, this implies that the larger
the number of organisational layers required in the firm (organisa-
tional complexity), the higher are the differences across consumers,
ceteris paribus. Each class distributes its consumption differently
across the different markets. These consumption shares evolve
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endogenously as new classes emerge in the economy, representing
Engel curves. Growth results from demand expansion, which is a
joint outcome of firm selection and technology investment.
The structure of the model is based on Ciarli et al. (2010) and
Ciarli and Lorentz (2010), which discuss the micro economic dyna-
mics that lead to growth in output via endogenous changes in
different aspects of economic structure. Ciarli et al. (2012) discuss
the non-linear effects of organisational complexity, production
technology and product variety on income growth and distribu-
tion. They show that output is negatively related to initial product
and demand variety, organisational complexity and faster techno-
logical change in capital goods increase output despite higher
inequality, and this last, in the form of large earning disparities,
leads to lower output growth.
In this paper we build on existing results and assess the relative
importance of all the factors that, in the model, determine the
initial conditions of structural change and also the pace at which
the different aspects of the economic structure evolve. The organi-
sation of production is defined by the structure of labour and
earnings disparities. Production technology is defined by the speed
of change in capital innovation, the share of resources invested in
R&D, and its success. Product technology is defined by the ability
of firms to explore new sectors for a given level of R&D invest-
ment, improved quality of a new product, and share of resources
invested in R&D. Income distribution is studied in relation to
profits in capital and final goods firms. Consumption patterns are
defined by the speed at which consumption shares change with
increases in income and class differentiations and changes in
consumer preferences promoted by the emergence of different
income classes. Whilst we define each aspect of structural change
based on specific factors, most of these factors induce structural
change in several aspects of the economy. For instance, the organi-
sation of labour has an impact on the evolution of income classes
and, therefore, also on patterns of consumption; the resources
invested in R&D reduce the profits available to be shared among
firm managers, which affects income distribution; and so on.
We use a full factorial experimental design (DOE) to analyse the
size and significance of the impact of the parameters that define
structural change, on output growth. We decompose and identify
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the aspects of structural change that have the strongest impact on
growth. We study the direct and indirect effects of the factors of
structural change, where indirect effects are those that occur
through those variables that also have an impact on income
growth. We focus on the role of the interactions among the diffe-
rent factors and different aspects of structural change.
Interactions among factors are of particular interest here, since
the early steps in the analysis show that in most cases the effect of
one specific factor that influences a particular aspect of structural
change varies radically for different levels of the other factors. In
many cases, the main effect of a factor defining the economic
structure is inverted under different structural conditions defined
by other factors. Second, we find that some aspects of structural
change, such as income distribution, changes to production tech-
nology and the emergence of new sectors, play a major role on
output growth, while the roles of others, such as changes in
consumption shares, preferences, and the quality of goods, play a
rather minor role. Related to this, we find that some factors can
radically modify the growth of an economy even when all other
aspects experience no structural change, whereas most factors, on
their own, do not affect outcomes if all other aspects change
rapidly. In other words, one single factor that induces rapid
changes in one particular aspect of the economy can induce
changes that lead to large growth in output; however, in econo-
mies already undergoing structural change in most aspects, slow
changes in most other factors have little influence. Finally, we find
that, when controlling for other model variables, the effect of most
factors on output growth is significantly reduced, showing large
indirect effects.
The arguments are organised as follows. First, we describe the
model focussing on the main micro dynamics and the main
aspects that are mostly affected by the factors that define structural
change (Section 1). Next we describe the methodology and briefly
present the model initialisation and design of experiment (DOE)
(Section 2). Section 3 is divided in four subsections. First, we
describe the general properties of the model, compare the model's
output with some empirical evidence, and show how the distribu-
tion of world income across countries can be explained by
different initial factors, with some caveats. Second, referring to the
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model, we show how each factor is suited to analysing one or more
aspects of structural change. Third, we use analysis of variance to
determine the significance of the main effects of factors and of the
interaction effects between pairs of factors. Fourth, we show results
from an econometric analysis of the factors to quantitatively assess
their relevance in the model, to distinguish direct from indirect
effects, and to assess the relevance and direction of the first order
interaction between each pair of factors. Section 4 discusses the
results and concludes the paper.
1. Model
1.1. Final good Firms
We model a population of firms producing final
goods for the consumer market. Each good satisfies one consumer
need . Or, equivalently, each firm produces in one of
the  sectors. For simplicity we refer interchangeably
to needs and sectors.2 The firms produce an output addressing a
consumer need n with two characteristics ij,fn: price pf,t = i1,fn and
quality qf,t = i2,fn.
1.1.1. Firm output and production factors
Firms produce using a fixed coefficients technology:3
Qf,t = min {Qdf,t ; Af,t–1 L1f ,t–1 ; BKf,t–1} (1)
where  Af,t–1  is the level of productivity of labour L1f,t–1 embodied in
the firm's capital stock Kf,t–1. Qdf,t  is the output required to cover the
expected demand Yef,t , past inventories Sf,t–1, and the new invento-
ries sYef,t : Qdf,t = (1 + s) Yet – S t–1. The capital intensity 1 / B is
constant.4
2. In referring to the same good, we prefer to refer to firm innovation in terms of sectors and
consumer demand in terms of needs. Establishing a mapping between the two is not one of the
aims of this paper and, ultimately, depends on the definition of sectors.
3. For the sake of readability we omit the sector/need index n.
4. This assumption is supported by evidence from several empirical studies, starting with
Kaldor (1957). The capital investment decision ensures that the actual capital intensity remains
fixed over time.
{1,2,..., }f F∈
{1,2,..., }n N∈
{1,2,..., }n N∈
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Firms form their sales expectations in an adaptive way to smooth
short term volatility (Chiarella et al., 2000): Yef,t = asYef,t–1 + (1 –as)Yf,t–1,
where (as) defines the speed of adaptation. We assume that the level
of demand faced by a firm is met by current production (Qf,t) and
inventories ( ), or is delayed (Sf,t–1 < 0) at no cost. Following
Blanchard (1983) and Blinder (1982), production smoothing is
achieved by means of inventories sYef,t  —where s is a fixed ratio.5
Given Qdf,t , labour productivity Af,t–1 and an unused labour
capacity (ul) to face unexpected increases in final demand, firms
hire shop-floor workers: 
(2)
where ε mimics labour market rigidities. Following Simon (1957)
firms also hire ''managers'': every batch of ν  workers requires one
manager. Each batch of ν second tier managers requires a third
level managers, and so on. The number of workers in each tier,
given L1f,t  is thus 
(3)
where  is the total number of tiers required to manage the firm f. 
Consequently, the total number of workers is 
The firm's capital stock is:6 
(4)
5. We assume adaptive rather than rational expectations. Here we assume an inventory/sales
ratio that corresponds to the minimum of the observed values (e.g., Bassin et al., 2003; U.S.
Census Bureau, 2008).
6. Following Amendola and Gaffard (1998) and Llerena and Lorentz (2004) capital goods
define the firm's production capacity and the productivity of its labour.
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where Vf  is the number of capital vintages purchased, kh,f  and τh
respectively the amount 3of capital and date of purchase of vintage
h, and δ  the depreciation rate. The firm's productivity embodied in
the capital stock then is the average productivity over all vintages
purchased: 
(5)
where ag,τh  is the productivity embodied in the h vintage.
Capital investment is driven by market outcomes and depends
on the expected demand
where u is the unused capital capacity. This is equivalent to assu-
ming that if the firm faces a capital constraint (because of an
increase in demand or a depreciation of the current stock) it
purchases new capital, accessing profits or an unconstrained finan-
cial market. Investment then defines the demand for capital good
firms: kdg,f,t = kef,t . Each firm selects one of the capital producers
 with a probability that depends positively on g's
output embodied productivity (ag,t–1), and negatively on its price
(pg,t–1) and cumulated demand of capital g still has to produce. The
delivery of the capital investment may take place after one or more
periods, during which the firm cannot make a new investment.
1.1.2. Wage setting, pricing and the use of profits
We model an aggregate minimum wage (wmin)  as an outwards
shifting wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2006; Nijkamp and
Poot, 2005), where unemployment is derived following a Beveridge
curve from the vacancy rate (Wall and Zoega, 2002; Nickell et al.,
2002; Teo et al., 2004), endogenously determined by firms' labour
demand. The minimum wage setting (Boeri, 2009) is related to
changes in labour productivity and the average price of goods.7
The wage of first tier workers is a multiple of the minimum wage,
w1f,t = ωwmin,t–1. For the following tiers the wage increases expo-
7. For a detailed description of the computation of the minimum wage see Ciarli et al. (2010).
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nentially by a factor b which determines the skewness of the wage
distribution (Simon, 1957; Lydall, 1959): 
(6)
Price is computed as a markup on unitary production costs
(Fabiani et al., 2006; Blinder, 1991; Hall et al., 1997), i.e. the total
wage bill divided by labour capacity:8 
(7)
The tier-wage structure implies diseconomies of scale in the
short-run, which is in line with the literature on the relation
between firm size and costs (e.g. Idson and Oi, 1999; Criscuolo,
2000; Bottazzi and Grazzi, 2010).
The profits (pif,t ) resulting from the difference between the value
of sales, pf,t–1Yf,t, and the cost of production,
 
are distributed between (i) investment in new capital (kef,t ), (ii)
product innovation R&D (Rf,t ) and (iii) bonuses to managers (Df,t ).
For simplicity we assume that firms always prioritise capital invest-
ment when they face a capital constraint, while the parameter ρ
determines the allocation of the remaining profits between R&D
and bonuses:9 
8. This is in line with evidence that firms revise prices once a year, mainly to accommodate
inputs and wage costs (Langbraaten et al., 2008).
9. We are aware of recent empirical evidence which suggest that R&D growth is caused by
growth in sales rather than profits (Coad and Rao, 2010; Moneta et al., 2010; Dosi et al., 2006).
Indeed, assuming a fixed markup, in our model profits are a constant share of sales. In other
words, we would maintain that R&D is related to sales figures but since the model does not
include a credit market we prefer to constrain R&D investment by the available resources, i.e.
profits. Moreover, the model accounts for the case where profits are distributed to managers and
not invested in R&D, for a very small ρ, as suggested in some of the cited literature. 
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(8)
(9)
 This amounts to assuming that (i) firms invest in R&D to seek
new sources of revenues, i.e. when they perceive a reduction in
competitiveness—as no new capital is required; (ii) respond to an
increase in demand reducing the resources constraint; and (iii)
distribute profits only when this does not interfere with the posi-
tive momentum—increase in demand, capital investment, increase
in productivity. We assume that bonuses are distributed proportio-
nate to wages, to the manager tiers . The overall
earnings of an employee in tier z is then wzf,t + ψ zf,t , where ψ zt  is
the share of redistributed profits to the managers of each tier  z.10
1.1.3. Product innovation
Firms innovate in two stages: first new products are discovered
through R&D, second they are introduced into the market. The
R&D activity has two phases: research, i.e. the choice of consumer
need/market n’ in which to focus the innovation effort, and deve-
lopment, i.e. the production of a prototype of quality q’f,t .
The range of sectors  that a firm can search is
centred on the knowledge base of the current sector of production
 (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and depends on R&D invest-
ment  and a parameter ι : 
(10)
where nint is the nearest integer function. Within this set a firm
selects the sector  with the largest excess demand Yxn,t .
10. This assumption is inspired by evidence that the exponential wage structure of a
hierarchical organisation is not sufficient to explain earnings disparities (Atkinson, 2007).
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The quality of the new prototype developed in sector n’ is
extracted from a normal distribution where the mean is equal to
the quality currently produced by the firm and the variance is
negatively related to the distance between the old and the new
sectors and positively related to a parameter ϑ: 
(11)
If the innovation occurs in n the new good is maintained only if
it is of higher quality than the currently produced good and if it
represents an incremental innovation in the market n. Otherwise,
the new product is discarded. If it is maintained the new good is
introduced in a set Φ of prototypes q’φ,f,t–1. If Φ includes less than
three prototypes the new one is added. If Φ = {0;...;3} the new
prototype replaces the one with the lowest quality as long as its
own quality is higher. Otherwise, the new product is discarded.
A firm introduces a new prototype in its market with a probabi-
lity negatively related to the growth of sales.11 We assume that a
firm introduces in the market its highest quality prototype. We
assume also that if a firm's prototype is for a different sector from
the one in which it is currently producing, it will be introduced in
this other sector only if the number of firms in that sector is lower
than in the current sector of production. In other words, a firm
moves to a new sector where there is less competition, or intro-
duces a higher quality product in the current sector of production.
1.2. Capital suppliers
The capital goods sector is formed of a population of
capital suppliers that produce one type of capital
good characterised by vintage τh and an embodied productivity aτh.
1.2.1. Output and production factors
In line with the empirical evidence (e.g. Doms and Dunne,
1998; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006) we assume that production
11. For positive growth the probability is 0. We follow the well know Schumpeterian argument
that firms innovate to seek new sources of revenues. The probabilistic behaviour captures firms'
limited forecasting capacity and distinguishes between temporary falls in sales from long term
structural downturns which are more likely to require an innovation.
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is just-in-time. Capital suppliers receive orders kdg,f,τf from firms in
the final good sectors—where τf  refers to the date of order—and
fulfil them following a first-in first-out rule. The total demand 
for a capital supplier is then the sum of current orders and past
unfulfilled orders
 .
For simplicity, we assume that capital producers employ labour
as the sole input, with constant returns to scale: Qg,t = L1g,t–1 ; in
each period firms sell the orders manufactured:
(12)
Similar to final goods firms, capital suppliers hire a number of
workers necessary to satisfy the demand plus a ratio u of unused
labour capacity: 
(13)
where ε mimics labour market rigidities. To organise production
capital suppliers hire an executive for every batch of vk production
workers L1g,t–1 , and one executive for every batch of vk second-tier
executives, and so on. The total number of workers in a firm there-
fore is: 
(14)
1.2.2. Process innovation
Capital firms use a share ρk of cumulated profits Πg,t to hire
R&D engineers. The maximum number of engineers is constrained
to a share vK of first tier workers:12 
(15)
12. See footnote 9 for a discussion of profits and R&D.
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The outcome of R&D is stochastic (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1998;
Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005), and the probability of success
depends on the resources invested in engineers and a parameter ζ
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Llerena and Lorentz, 2004): 
(16)
If the R&D is successful13 a firm develops a new capital vintage
with productivity extracted from a normal distribution centred on
its current productivity: 
(17)
where is a normally distributed random function.
The higher is σ a the larger are the potential increases in producti-
vity. The new level of productivity enters the capital good
produced by the firm for the following period and sold to the final
good firms.
1.2.3. Wage setting, price and profits
The price of capital goods is computed as a markup (µk ) over
variable costs (wages divided by output (Qg,t)): 
(18)
where wEg,t  is the wage of engineers. The first tier wage is a multiple
of the minimum wage wmin,t , such as the wages paid to the engi-
neers (wEwmin,t–1 ). For simplicity we assume no layer/manager
structure among the engineers. Wages increase exponentially
through the firm's tiers by a factor b identical to the final goods
firms.
Profits resulting from the difference between the value of sales
pg,t Yg,t and the costs for workers and engineers
13. R&D is successful when a random number from a uniform distribution [0; 1] is smaller than
Pinng, t .
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are cumulated (Πg,t ). The share not used for R&D (1–pk) is distri-
buted to managers as bonuses, proportionate to their wages: 
Dg,t = max {0;(1 – ρk )Πg,t} (19)
where
1.3. Demand
The composition of demand depends directly on the structure
of production (product technology, firm organisation and labour
structure, and production technology) acting as the endogenous
transmission mechanism through which structural changes on the
supply side affect changes to consumption.
We assume that each tier of employees in the hierarchical orga-
nisation of firms defines one (income) class of consumers with the
same income (Wz), consumption share (cn,z), and preferences (υiz).
This is a restrictive assumption, but also an improvement with
respect to models that assume two fixed classes (rural and urban)
or homogeneous consumers.
1.3.1. Income distribution and consumption shares
The income of each consumer class 14 is the sum
of wages (W wz,t ), distributed profits (W ψz,t ) and an exogenous
income ( ): 
(20)
Consumers react to changes in total income, changing total
current consumption by a small fraction  and postponing
the remaining income for future consumption (Krueger and Perri,
2005): 
(21)
14. Where Λt  is the number of tiers in the largest firm in the market, and z = 0 is the class of
engineers in capital sector firms.
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Consumers divide total consumption across different needs
, each satisfied by a different sector, and allocate to
each need a share cn,z. The desired consumption per need then is
simply   (where  ).
Following the empirical literature on Engel curves we allow
these expenditure shares to vary endogenously across income
classes, representing a different income elasticity for different
income classes and different consumption goods (needs in this
model). As we move from low to high income classes the expendi-
ture shares change from ''primary'' to ''luxury'' goods at a rate η: 
(22)
where is an 'asymptotic' consumption share of the richest theo-
retical class, towards which new classes of workers (with higher
income) emerging endogenously tend (see equations 3 and 14).
The ''asymptotic'' distribution is defined as the consumption shares
of the top income centile in the UK in 2005 for the ten aggregate
sectors (Office for National Statistics, 2006)—which we assume
satisfy ten different needs—ordered from smallest to largest
(Figure 1).15 For reasons of simplicity (and lack of reliable data) we
assume that the consumption shares of the first tier class, 2000
periods before—the initial period in the model, are distributed
symmetrically (Figure 1).16  
If the goods available on the market satisfy only a limited
number of needs—since new goods are discovered through firms'
R&D—consumers adapt consumption shares accordingly, redistri-
buting the shares for non available needs to the needs that are
available, proportional to the consumption shares of their existing
needs. The demand for non available needs is defined as excess
demand, which works as the signal for final goods firms to choose
the sector in which to innovate: 
(23)
15. We thank Alessio Moneta for these data.
16. Madisson (2001) provides qualitative evidence to support this assumption about changes in
household expenditure shares.
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1.3.2. Consumer behaviour and firm sales
We model consumers who purchase a number of goods in each
of the available markets with lexicographic preferences. In line
with the experimental psychology literature (e.g. Gigerenzer, 1997;
Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001) we assume also that consumers have
imperfect information on the characteristics of goods, and that
they develop routines to match a satisficing behaviour, leading to
the purchase of goods equivalent to the optimal good.
Consumer classes access the market in sequence and demand a
non negative quantity of goods from each firm. Firm demand is
defined as follows. Consumers in a class z are divided into
 identical groups with an equal share of the class 
income . 
First, a consumer group m screens all the goods on offer from all the
firms in the market (need) and observes their characteristics
 , 
Figure 1. Expenditure shares: initial and asymptotic
The distribution of the asymptotic level of shares corresponds to current expenditure shares 
for the highest percentile of UK consumers. For simplicity, initial shares are assumed to be 
distributed symmetrically
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where σ ij measures the extent of incomplete information, which
differs for quality and price (Celsi and Olson, 1988; Zeithaml,
1988).
Consumer preferences are modelled here as degree of tolerance
over shortfalls with respect to the best good available in the market
in terms of its characteristics . That is, given the tolerance
level  a consumer is indifferent towards all of the goods
that have a quality above  and a price below . In
other words, for a very large υj,z a consumer buys only from the
best firm in the market, while a small υj,z indicates indifference
towards a large number of goods that differ in terms of price and
quality. We assume also that preferences change across income
classes: first tier workers have a high tolerance towards quality
differences (υ2,1 = υ
min) and very low tolerance towards price diffe-
rences (υ1,1 = υ
max). As we move to higher income classes, tolerance
towards price differences increases and tolerance towards quality
differences reduces by a factor ς : 
(24)
Then, a consumer group selects the subset of firms that matches
its preferences:
 ,
and purchases are equally distributed among selected firms. Then,
the total demand of a firm in market n is the sum of sales across all
groups and classes: 
(25)
2. Methodology 
The main aim of this paper is to assess the relative effects of the
parameters that define the different aspects of structural change.
The model is agent-based and has no analytical solution, but we
can study its properties with a systematic numerical analysis. We
do so using a simple experimental design. We describe the initiali-
sation of the model, and then the method of analysis.
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Table 1 presents the initial conditions and the value of the para-
meters not included in the DOE.17 For these parameters we also
Table 1. Parameters setting
Parameter's (1) name, (2) description, (3) value, and (4) empirical data range
  Parameter  Description  Value  Data 
i2 Initial min quality level  98  Analysed 
i2 Initial max quality level  102  Analysed 
a s Adaptation of sales expectations  0.9      // a 
s Desired ratio of inventories  0.1  [0.11 - 0.25] b 
ul Unused labor capacity  0.05  0.046 c 
u Unused capital capacity  0.05  0.046 c 
δ! Capital depreciation  0.001  [0.03, 0.14]; [0.016, 0.31] d 
Capital intensity  0.4  B = [1.36, 2.51] e  
ε Labor market friction (final firms)  0.9  0.6; [0.6, 1.5]; [0.7, 1.4]; [0.3, 1.4] f
ω Minimum wage multiplier  2  [1.6, 3.7] g 
1-!! Smoothing parameter  0.2  [.04, .14]; [.06, .19] 
h
σ ij
Error in the consumer's 
evaluation of characteristics 
j = 1: 0.05; 
j = 2: 0.1 
     // i
 
ωE Engineers' wage multiplier  1.5  [1.2, 1.4] j 
υ min=υ 2,1 Highest = first tier quality tolerance  0.1      // 
υ max=υ 1,1 Lowest = first tier quality tolerance  0.9      // 
F Final good firms  100      // 
G Capital good firms  10      // 
Hz Consumer samples  100      // 
N Number of needs  10      // 
a) Empirical evidence not available: the parameters has no influence on the results presented here. 
b) U.S. Census Bureau (2008); Bassin et al. (2003). 
c) Coelli et al. (2002), with reference to the `optimal' unused capacity. 
d) Nadiri and Prucha (1996); Fraumeni (1997) non residential equipment and structures. We use the lower limit
value, (considering 1 year as 10 simulation steps) to avoid growth in the first periods to be determined by the repla-
cement of capital. 
e) King and Levine (1994).
f) Vacancy duration (days or weeks) over one month: (Davis et al., 2010; Jung and Kuhn, 2011; Andrews et al., 2008;
DeVaro, 2005.
g) Ratio with respect to the average (not minimum) wage in the OECD countries (Boeri, 2009). 
h) Krueger and Perri (2005); Gervais and Klein (2010). 
i) No empirical evidence available to the best of our knowledge. Parameters set using the qualitative evidence in Zei-
thaml (1988). 
j) Relative to all College Graduates and to accountants (Ryoo and Rosen, 1992). 
17. The remaining factors are presented in Table 7.
1
B
Tommaso Ciarli314
report the data ranges available from empirical evidence. While we
are not calibrating the model to any specific economy, all parame-
ters are within the ranges observed across countries and over time.
In t = 0 firms produce goods in the first two sectors, and consu-
mers can satisfy only those two needs.18 Final goods firms differ
only with respect to the quality of the good produced, which is
extracted from a uniform distribution (i2 ~ U [i2 ,i2]). All capital
goods firms are identical. All firms are small, requiring only one
manager; capital good firms also hire engineers. This labour struc-
ture defines three initial classes of consumers: engineers, first tier
workers, and one manager tier.
2.1. Experimental Design
To analyse the effect of the parameters that define the structure
of the economy (Table 7) we make use of the simplest DOE, the 2k
full factorial design. It consists of analysing k factors at two diffe-
rent levels (typically High and Low), simulating all possible
combinations of both levels (Montgomery, 2001; Kleijnen et al.,
Summer 2005). 2k factorial designs are appropriate for the purposes
of this paper: to study the main effects of a large number of factors,
and to identify the factors that are more influential on the model
behaviour from those that are less relevant; to study a large
number of interactions of different orders, between factors; and to,
at the same time, minimise the number of simulation runs
required to study a large number of factors in a complete design
(Montgomery, 2001).
In particular, we analyse the effect of the ten factors that define
the initial structure of the economy and the scale at which it
changes through time. To each parameter we assign ''Low'' and
''High'' values (Table 7), which we consider to be the theoretical
extreme values (observed infrequently). In Appendix A we provide
evidence for the choice of the extreme values.
We test all 210 combinations of Low and High values of the
i = 1, ..., I factors. We run 20 replicates for each combination for
2000 periods.19 We then totalise a sample of  factor responses (i.e.
output variables) yijlt where j = {1, ..., 1024} is the number of
18. The remaining sectors may emerge as a result of firms' product innovation.
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designs—combinations of the different parameters, l = {1, ..., 20} is
the number of replicates, and t = {1, ..., 2000} is the time periods.20
We focus on aggregate outputs and analyse the responses using
various methods, taking into account the violations of normality
and constancy of variance in the responses (Kleijnen, 2008).21
First, we assess the significance of the factors effect and of their first
level interactions with an analysis of variance. Then, we study the
relative importance of factors and their interactions, controlling
for the effect of a number of variables and using Least Absolute
Deviation (LAD) regressions. A graphical description of the impact
of each factor on output can be found in the working paper version
(Ciarli, 2012).
3. Results
Using the baseline configuration (simulated for 200 replicates)
the model generates long term endogenous growth in output with
a transition from linear growth to exponential growth (Figure 2
(a))—occurring here around t = 1400 —(Maddison, 2001; but also
Galor, 2010). Output growth is preceded by an increase in aggre-
gate productivity. The linear growth is characterised by very low
investment rate, that induce slow changes in productivity, and is
driven by the final demand—via slow grow in firm size, and
demand for labour. 
The transition to the second phase occurs as heterogeneous
firms emerge—due to the acquisition of slightly different vintages
and their own innovation—and the linearly increasing working
population selects the best firms. Selection induces large changes
in the demand for few firms, that require large investment in new,
more productive, capital. Demand for new capital, in turn, spurs
innovation in the capital sector, which supply even more produc-
19. Our model is a non terminating simulation, which requires us to choose a cut-off point
when the simulation enters a ''normal, long run'' regime (Law, 2004). For some responses, such
as output, under a large number of factorial combinations the model does not reach a steady
state. For others, such as output growth and market concentration, the model reaches a ''long-
run steady state'' before 2000 periods.
20. 20,480 simulation runs and 40,960,000 observations.
21. Our model and simulation procedure satisfy the remaining properties outlined in Kleijnen
(2008). See also Montgomery (2001) for a comprehensive treatment of the analysis of
experiments in simulations.
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tive capital goods. This starts a cumulative causation process
characterised by decreasing prices and increasing consumption,
profits, investment, and tiers of workers, which induce more
demand heterogeneity, at the higher inequality (Ciarli et al., 2010).
Indeed, we provide evidence of the often observed non-linear rela-
tion between inequality and income (Kuznets curve) for the period
from before take off to the end of the simulation (Figure 2 (b)).22  
For given values of the extent of exploration of new sectors, the
model qualitatively reproduces the s-shaped curve characterising
the growth in sectoral output from birth to diffusion in the
economy (Figure 3). Both figures show that at this level of aggrega-
tion, sectors are not expected to disappear (as it would be the case
with goods). Both figures also show that the emergence of new
sector is concentrated in a relatively short time span. However, the
simulated results show a higher concentration of emergence, due
Figure 2. Model properties: output (log), productivity and Kuznets curve
In graph (a) we plot the time series of output in log scale, and aggregate productivity in linear 
scale. In graph (b) we plot the relation between output (log) and the Atkinson index (dotted 
line), and the polynomial curve fit (full line) with confidence intervals (blune lines), for the 
period 1400-2000
22. Inequality is computed using the Atkinson index: 
where Wz,t is the total income of consumer class z, Lz,t is the total number of workers in class z
and ! is the measure of inequality aversion. As we are not measuring an empirical level of
inequality, we use an intermediate value of ! = 0.5.
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to the fact that we have a fixed number of needs—unlike real
sectors, that firms attempt to satisfy as soon as they manage to
search all sectors: a lower ι would imply a less clustered emergence
(see equation 10). 
Table 8 in the Appendix reports the results of a Vector Autore-
gressive (VAR) analysis on 10 period growth rates, and coefficients
estimated using LAD—with bootstrapped standard errors. The VAR
shows the relations between output (1), aggregate productivity (2),
average price (3), the inverse Herfindahl index (4) and the
Atkinson index of inequality (5). Results are in line with the
expected macro dynamics. All variables show a strong cumulative
process with one lag. Inequality growth has an immediate positive
effect on output (1 lag) which becomes negative after three lags.
Similarly, an increase in market concentration has an immediate
negative effect on output (1 lag), which becomes positive after two
lags. Market concentration also determines an increase in prices
and inequality. The effect of productivity on output in this short-
run analysis is captured through price reduction, which has an
immediate positive effect on output (1 lag). A detailed discussion
on the short and long run dynamics of a previous version of this
model can be found in Ciarli et al. (2010) and Ciarli et al. (2012).
3.1. Distribution of income across countries
We now move to the analysis of the model for the 2k combina-
tions of factors. Each combination of factors in the model can be
interpreted as a different country with different initial conditions.
Figure 3. Sectoral output: industrial production in Britain and simulation results
(a) Sectoral output (log scale) computed by Rostow (1978) (cited in Aoki and Yoshikawa, 
2002); (b) sectoral output (log) from the model results with ι = 0.005 
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We thus compare the distribution of the average growth rate of
GDP from 1980 to 2010 across countries using IMF data, with the
distribution of average growth rate of output from period 1 to 2000
across factorial designs using the simulated data (Figure 4). The
distribution is definitely more skewed in our simulations across
different combination of factors than across world economies.
There are three main reasons for this. First, a trivial one: we look at
2000 periods, which includes long periods of stagnation that
precede take-off (see above), while the IMF data refer to the the
period between 1970 and the present.
Second, we are analysing the model under extremely ''stressful''
conditions, i.e. for extreme values of the parameters not generally
observed in the real world (see Table 7). For example, for some
factor combinations no investment occurs, and the economy
stagnates over the 2000 periods. To show the relevance of these
extreme conditions on the distribution of output we show the
probability that a low or a high value of the parameters occurs for
designs with very high income. We analyse the following parame-
ters: the variance of the distribution that determine an increase in
the productivity of capital (σ a), the wage differentials between
classes (b), the probability of process innovation (ζ ), and the
markup (µ). Figure 5 plots the density of these four parameters
when the level of output (log) is larger than 36, the top bin of the
world income distribution according to IMF data. For these extre-
Figure 4. Income growth distributions—world Vs simulation
Graph (a) plots the distribution of income growth (averaged over 1980-2010) across world 
economies (Source IMF); graph (b) plots the distribution of output growth (averaged for 1-
2000) across different combinations of factors
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mely high levels of output we observe almost one single
combination of factors: σ a is high with probability 1,23 b is low
with probability around .95, ζ  is high with probability nearly 1
and µ is high with probability .95. 
The third related reason for the atypical distribution of output
growth in our model simulated across the 2k different factor combi-
nations is due to the DOE: in Figure 4 (b) we are overlapping
distributions from different data generation processes, where each
combination of the High and Low values of the parameters repre-
sent one process. We show below that some parameters have a
dramatic effect on the output variables. The distribution of output
variables differs enormously when these parameters switch from
one state to another. We show this again by comparing the distri-
butions in the simulated data. Figure 6 plots the distribution of
output for different combinations of some influencing parameters
with High and Low values. It is sufficient to compare the support
23. We denote the low level of the parameters as 0 and the high level of the parameter as 1.
Figure 5. Density of some parameters when Log output > 36
0 denotes a low value of the parameter and 1 denotes a high value. For extremely high values 
of output the parameters take almost always the same value
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of the total distribution (the last one in the figure, for all values of
the parameters) with the support of any other distribution which
represents a combination of different High and Low values (1,0) of
σ a, µ, ι, v, b. In only one case the support is the same. In most
cases, the support is radically different (lower by a factor 10 or 30). 
To sum up, the overall distribution of output variables, such as
output in the final period, and the average rate of output growth
over periods, cannot be approximated satisfactorily by any theore-
tical distribution that we know of: the closest would be the Pareto
distribution.
The above discussion suggests that economies endowed with
different factors that determine the initial structural conditions
and the way in which structural changes in different aspects of the
economy unfold (or not), experience very different growth paths.
By testing extreme values of these conditions we see that a limited
number of economic aspects—different from the beginning—
Figure 6. Distribution of output (log) for different High and Low values of the 
parameters
σ a, µ, ι, v, b ; 0 denotes a low value and 1 denotes a high value
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produce dramatic differences in growth. Also the way that these
different aspects of structural change interact seems to be relevant.
The rest of the paper provides a detailed analysis of the (main,
interactive, direct and indirect) effects of these factors on the final
distribution of output across economies with very different star-
ting conditions.
3.2. The factors of structural change 
Before analysing factor responses we briefly summarise the
effect of the different factors (parameters) that define the initial
structure of the economy and the dynamics of structural change.24
We group them with respect to the aspects of structural change
they capture directly: product technology, production technology,
organisation of production (which refer mainly to the structure of
employment), income distribution and consumption patterns.
Table 7 summarises the ''Low'' and ''High'' values, the main aspects
affected, and the equation where they appear. Appendix A
provides detail for the choice of the ''Low'' and ''High'' values. 
24. The terms factors and parameters are used interchangeably.
Table 2. Effect of parameters on structural change
A ''+'' indicates that the High value of the parameter induces relatively 
more structural change
  Factor  Equation  High/Low  Low  High 
 Main 
Economic 
aspect a
 Main 
indirect 
aspects a 
"#   10 +  .001  .3  3  _
v   3 _  3  50  1  4, 5
b   6 +  1  3  1  4 
σ a   17 +  .01  .2  2  1
η  22 +  .1  3  5  _
ρ  = ρ k  8, 15 +  .05  .95  3, 2  4
ϑ   11 +  .01  10  3  _
ζ   16 +  .1  1000  2  1
ς 24 +  .05  .9  5  _
µ = µ K  7, 18 +  1.01  2  4  2,3, 1
a 1: Organisation of production; 2: Production technology; 3: Product technology; 4: Income distribution; 
5: Consumption patterns 
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Product technology: ι, ϑ, ρ. All these factors have an effect on
the variety in the final goods market, ι determining the pace at
which new goods are discovered, ϑ influencing the rate of change
in the quality of new goods and ρ altering the resources employed
by the firm for the exploration of new goods. ι and ϑ play no other
role in structural change; ρ influence the distribution of income
through the share of profit not redistributed as bonuses and used
for R&D.
Production technology: σ a, ζ, ρk. Large values of σ a and ζ
directly modify the capital structure of the economy, determining
the pace at which innovation occurs in the capital goods sector; ρk
has the same effect as ρ in altering the resources devoted to R&D.
All three factors have a number of indirect effects on other aspects
of structural change. Similar to ρ, ρk influences the income distri-
bution. σ a and ζ  in addition to altering the productivity of the
final goods firm, modify the demand for production factors
(labour and capital), affecting firms' labour structure (through
changes in size). Also, given the different pace at which different
firms change capital vintages, σ a and ζ  change the distribution of
prices in the final goods market, allowing consumers to select
based on their price preferences.
Organisation of production: v and b. Both parameters define
the way in which a firm is organised: a very low v means that a
corporation needs a large number of tiers to organise a small pool
of workers, whereas for a large v a single manager can deal with a
large production unit (few changes as the size of the corporation
increases). b tells us simply how the different levels of workers and
managers are paid (and bonuses are distributed). Both parameters
have a strong bearing on the distribution of income as they impli-
citly determine the number of income classes (v) and their wage
income. Indeed, v indirectly influences also at least one other
aspect of the economy—changes in consumption patterns—by
altering the pace at which new classes with different consumption
styles endogenously emerge.
Income distribution: µ, µk. For a small ρ and low capital invest-
ment a large µ implies a redistribution of income from all
consumers to higher classes. Indeed, an increase in µ also increases
the resources available for investment in R&D—thus it increases
the pace at which product and production technology change.
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Finally, differences in markups indicate different market struc-
tures, from competitive to oligopolistic.
Consumption patterns: η, ς. High level of both factors induce
faster change in consumption behaviour. A high η implies a very
fast change in expenditure shares from basic needs to the asymp-
totic distribution that of the top income centile of UK consumers
in 2005. ς  changes the consumer preferences in a given classes, for
a given expenditure share: a large ς implies that the tolerance for
relatively lower quality (higher price) goods decreases (increases) at
a faster rate moving towards the high income classes.
Main and cross effects (without normalising the scale). A
simple graphical analysis explaining the main and the cross effects
of the factors is detailed in Ciarli (2012). Given the scale effect that
underlies these results, in this paper we focus on the analysis of
variance (next section). However, a summary of the entity of the
effect of each parameter—which, including its scale, reflects the
fact that the parameters represent very different dimensions of
structural conditions—is a useful complement to an analysis of
variance that informs on the significance of the effects, but not on
their magnitude (more in Section 3.4).
For simplicity, we explored two extreme cases, out of the thou-
sand possible states of the world analysed in this paper: we
analysed the impact on total output of each factor when all other
factors are either Low (L) or High (H). We found that, in the case
where parameters induce low structural change in all dimensions
of the economy, a single factor inducing high structural change is
sufficient for a strong effect on output. However, this does not
apply to all factors and especially not to those that determine
changes in the structure of consumption: the wage multiplier (b)
and a higher variance of the productivity shock (σ a) have the
strongest positive effects, followed by the exploration of new
goods (ι); while ρ (share of profits invested in R&D) and µ (mark-
up) have the strongest negative impact. On the other hand, if all
the parameters induce high structural change in all dimensions of
the economy, then just two of the parameters inducing low struc-
tural change will have an effect on output (ρ and µ).
We found also that the effect of each parameter in many cases is
not monotonous: the signs of the main effects change if some of
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the other factors change from inducing low to inducing high struc-
tural change. For example, we analysed the effect of a more or less
complex organisational structure (v) under varying structural
conditions, such as wage regimes (b) the likelihood of inventing a
new product (ι), and increases in the productivity of capital
vintages (σ a). We found that, while a few factors do not interact
with v – η, ϑ, ς, and ζ, some induce only a level effect—ρ and µ—,
ι, b, and σ a change the sign of the effect of v: when they are Low,
an increase in v has a mild positive effect on output; when they are
High, an increase in v has a strong negative effect on output. This
seems to suggest that highly complex organisations (which require
many organisational layers, i.e., many employees receiving diffe-
rent levels of remuneration, for a given number of workers in the
first tier) have a positive impact on output growth when markets
diversify quickly (High ι), when firms can recover the higher orga-
nisational costs (reflected in higher consumer prices) through
increased productivity growth (High σ a), and when wages differ
between organisational layers (b). The rapid vertical growth of
firms in fact creates classes of workers with different consumption
shares and different preferences, i.e. consumers that buy more
goods from markets that firms still need to discover (with a High ι)
and that are ready to buy goods at higher prices. However, the
higher organisational costs translate into lower aggregate demand.
The net effect on output is positive only if either product innova-
tion brings results in rapid time to market for goods to satisfy the
emerging classes of consumers, or when rapid change in product
technology compensates for increasing prices (or possibly if both
conditions hold).
3.3. Analysis of variance: the significance of factors' interactions
In order to assess the statistical significance of the effect of each
factor, and the joint significance of the different factors on output,
we run an ANOVA on 20 replicates for each combination of para-
meters. The results in Table 3 show that apart from η and ς—
respectively the speed of convergence of the expenditure shares
and of the change in the preferences of consumers for a good's
characteristics—all parameters have a significant main effect, even
when tested jointly—when considering the effect of each para-
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meter for all possible states of the world (High and Low values of
the other factors).  
Due to the blatant departure from normality of the output
variable, we check the robustness of the results of the ANOVA by
testing one way differences between the samples defined by the
parameters High and Low values with a Kruskal-Wallis (KW) equa-
lity of population rank test. The results (see Table 9 in the
Appendix B) differ from the ANOVA only with respect to η, which
turns out to have a small but significant negative effect.25 The one
way mean test confirms the results from the graphical analysis:
high values of ι, v, b, σ a, ϑ and ζ are associated with a higher
output; high values of ρ and µ are associated with a lower output;
and η and ς  have a negligible effect.
This similarity makes us confident that the results of the
ANOVA for our large sample are informative, and we proceed to
analyse the significance of the first order interactions between all
factors. For instance, as discussed above, ι, b, and σ a modify the
effect of the organisation structure on output. We analyse these
interactions more systematically in Table 4, which summarises the
Table 3. ANOVA – main effects
   Source  Partial SS  df  MS  F  Prob>F 
Model 1.258e+06  9  139790  414.1  0.00
 
"# 4840  1  4840  14.34  0.00
v  101546  1  101546  300.8  0.00
b 114912  1  114912  340.4  0.00
σ a 260782  1  260782  772.6  0.00
η 691  1  691  2.05  0.15
ρ   481609  1  481609  1427  0.00
ϑ  1399  1  1399  4.150  0.04
ζ  240068  1  240068  711.2  0.00
ς  0.821  1  0.821  0  0.96
µ  52954  1  52954  156.9 0.00
 
Residual  6.909e+06  20469  337.5
 Total  8.168e+06  20479  398.8
Number of obs = 20480; Root MSE = 18.37; R-squared = 0.154; Adj R-squared = 0.154
25. However, note that the KW test is one way.
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results of the ANOVA that includes all the main effects and first
order interactions (i.e. all possible interactions between two diffe-
rent factors).  
Table 4 confirms the intuition—from the analysis of distribu-
tions of output (Figure 6)—that most factors induce structural
changes that have a significant effect which differs (in size or direc-
tion) for different combinations of the other factors, that is, which
is subject to the structural changes induced by the other factors. In
other words, the different dimensions of structural changes
induced by the factors, significantly interact in determining the
aggregate behaviour of the economy.
For example, what would be the effect on growth of increasing
the opportunities for R&D in the capital sector (σ a)? As shown in
Table 3, σ a alone has an apparent impact on output. However,
Table 4 shows that the role of the production technology crucially
depends on many other structural aspect of the economy, such as
the organisation of production (v, b), and especially the share of
profits invested in R&D and its effectiveness on the innovation
result (ρ, ζ ). Its strong effect on output is relatively independent of
the introduction of product variety in the consumer market (ι, ϑ)
and of the structure of demand for more variety (η, ς).
To better discriminate among the different aspects of the struc-
ture of an economy, in the next section we perform a regression
analysis that allows us to quantify the effect of factors across designs.
Table 4. ANOVA – first order interactions
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
"# v b σ a η ρ ϑ ζ ς µ 
"#  0          
v  **  ***         
b  ***  ***  ***        
σ a  0  ***  ***  ***       
η  **  0  0  0  0      
ρ   ***  ***  ***  ***  0  ***     
ϑ  0  0  0  0  0  **  0    
ζ  **  ***  ***  ***  0  ***  0  ***   
ς  0  ***  *  0  0  0  *  0  0  
µ  **  ***  ***  ***  0  ***  0  ***  **  ***
Note: Values on the diagonal refer to the factor main effect. 
***Prob > F < 0.01; **Prob > F < 0.05; *Prob > F < 0.1; 0: Prob > F > 0.1
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3.4. The relative influence of the different aspects of structural 
change
We run quantile regressions (with bootstrapped standard errors)
to estimate the relative impact and significance of each factor and
their first order interactions on output. We distinguish between
direct and indirect impact: Table 5 reports estimates for the factors
(1), for a number of control variables, most of which are correlated
to the factors (2), and for the parameters when the least correlated
control variables are included—a sort of reduced form of the model
(3).26 Table 6 reports the estimates for the parameters and their
first order interactions, with and without control variables (respec-
tively bottom-left and top-right triangular matrix).
On average, when abstracting from the different structural
change regimes (column 2), the model shows that aggregate labour
productivity (!)—measured as output per worker—is strongly and
positively correlated to output as well as average expenditure on
R&D (across firms and time periods) (R). As noted elsewhere (Ciarli
et al., 2010; Ciarli and Lorentz, 2010), product variety (averaged
over the full period)— σ q and σ p, respectively for quality and
price—and the selection that they enable also positively affect
output; but their effect is weak and non-significant when control-
ling for inequality and productivity, which is the prime cause of
price differences. Inequality (!T), averaged over the whole period,
has an overall negative effect on output. 
  With reference to factors (column 1), ρ and µ determine struc-
tural changes with the strongest (negative) effect on output,
followed by σ α, ι and b. Related to σ α, ζ also has a positive and
significant effect. The least relevant are the structural changes
induced by v, ς  (positive) and η  (negative).
The factors determining structural change also influence the
dynamics of a large number of variables. Therefore, the estimated
effect of a variable on output (Table 5) is likely to differ for diffe-
rent levels of the parameters. Likewise, the use of control variables
in the estimation of parameters allows us to estimate the direct
effect of the factors on output, depurated from the indirect effect
through the control variables.
26. The estimated sample is the result of the simulations for the last period for 20 replicates of
each combination of parameters.
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Table 5. The relative impact of factors and main variables on output
LAD estimates with s.e. obtained from bootstrapping (400); the dependent variable is 
(Log) output
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables  Factors  Contr Var  F & CV 
        
"#  0.692***   1.063*** 
  (0.056)    (0.071) 
 v  0.009***   -0.012*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
 b  0.107***   -0.061*** 
  (0.008)    (0.007) 
σ a  3.242***   0.966*** 
  (0.088)    (0.083) 
η  -0.023***   -0.016*** 
  (0.006)    (0.004) 
ρ   -4.900***   -3.947*** 
  (0.024)    (0.036) 
ϑ  0.013***   0.003** 
  (0.002)    (0.001) 
ζ  0.001***   0.000*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
ς  0.040**   0.021* 
  (0.019)    (0.011) 
µ  -9.330***   -9.510*** 
  (0.018)    (0.021) 
A   1.201***  2.900*** 
    (0.071)  (0.057) 
!"T   -3.809***  3.523*** 
    (1.109)  (0.109) 
σp   0.119*  -0.092*** 
    (0.065)  (0.004) 
σq   0.001  0.000*** 
    (0.001)  (0.000) 
R   0.779***  
    (0.048)   
Constant  28.301***  12.944***  29.424*** 
 (0.043)  (0.380)  (0.075) 
Observations  20,480  20,480  20,480 
Pseudo R2  0.43  0.09  0.48 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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To better show this interaction between factors and economic
variables, Figure 7 plots the relation between an independent
variable, aggregated productivity, and output (Log), for different
values of the parameters.  In panel a no restrictions on parameters
are imposed, and the relation between the two variables is distinctly
non-linear and non monotonic. More importantly, panel a suggests
that the relation between productivity and output could be reduced
to different functional forms, depending on the combination of
factors. In panel b we restrict all factors to either the high or the low
value: aggregate productivity does not show any significant effect
on output under either condition. Results are different if we allow
the parameters that are strongly related to aggregate productivity to
fluctuate. In panel c all factors are either high or low, except for ρ,
which takes both values. Although the relation between the two
variables is not so clear cut, the scale is radically different—the
small dot in the bottom left of panel c is the flat relation that we
observe at the bottom right side of panel b. Alternatively, for diffe-
rent levels of markup (µ) the relation turns from null to positive, for
high values of all other parameters (panel d).
Returning to Table 6, column (3) shows estimates for the direct
effects of the factors and for the effect of the least correlated
variables. First, the sign of the two factors defining the organisa-
tion of production are inverted. A high v means a lower number of
(organisational) workers per good produced, increasing labour
productivity. When we control for labour productivity, though,
the lower number of tiers for a given number of shopfloor workers
reduces the pace at which firms grow in size and diversify by
adding different levels of workers and managers (see Eq. 3 and 14).
The effect on structural change is a slower increase in the aggregate
demand and its variety, and a negative impact on output growth.
While large wage differentials (b) increase inequality, which has a
negative effect on output, ceteris paribus, but which in our model is
associated also with larger aggregate demand (Eq. 20); thus the
inverted sign of !T when controlling for the factors. Second, the
direct effect of σ α is strongly reduced when controlling for aggre-
gate productivity. Third, the estimated effect of a few variables
change their sign and significance as we control for different
combinations of the factors determining structural changes.
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As already mentioned, the effect that each of the factors induces
on structural change depends also on other structural aspects. The
relevance of the interaction among several factors is established in
the results of the quantile regression where all first order interac-
tions are estimated together with the main effects, with and
without the control variables Table 6. We estimate the effect of the
high value of factors, the low value being the reference case. Esti-
mates without control variables are reported in the top-right
triangular matrix and those that include control variables are
reported in the bottom-left triangular matrix. On the diagonal we
report the main effects (when controlling for interactions). In the
following we discuss the estimates obtained when including the
control variables (bottom-left triangle). First, the results in Table 6
show that the main effects are strongly significant, despite the
inclusion of the interaction terms. Second, most of the first order
interaction terms are also significant, particularly when they
Figure 7. Aggregate productivity Vs output (Log)
T=2000, aggregate productivity on the x-axis and output on the y-axis
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include a factor shown to have a significant main effect. We
proceed by discussing the effect of the different aspects of struc-
tural change, following the classification in Table 2.
Product technology: ι, ϑ, ρ. The effect on output of rapid emer-
gence of new sectors is large and positive on average, but is always
negative when other factors induce strong structural change (with
the exception of the factors defining consumption patterns, η and
ς). That is, for fast changes in consumption shares and/or prefe-
rences the high level of ι has a (weakly) significant positive effect.
We note also that the interaction between the two main factors of
product technology, ι and ϑ—respectively needs and quality—is
not significant.
Table 6. LAD regression – the effect of first order interactions on output
The top-right triangular matrix shows estimates without control variables; the bottom-left 
triangular matrix shows estimates with control variables. 
The dependent variable is output (Log)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
"# v b σ a η ρ  ϕ ζ ς µ
 
"#
1.51 0.16 -0.09 -0.31 -0.01 -0.55 0.03 -0.18 0.04 -0.97 
1.38          
v
0.28 0.33 -0.95 0.69 0.23 -0.56 -0.08 0.62 0.12 0.20 
   -0.81         
 
b 
-0.10 -0.16 1.14 -0.24 -0.15 0.11 -0.05 -0.34 -0.28 0.10 
  0.10        
 
σa
-0.37 0.68 -0.34 1.51 0.00 -1.58 0.09   2.26   -0.12   -0.73 
   1.39       
 
η
0.04 0.28 -0.21 -0.03 -0.18 0.00 -0.02  -0.04   0.08   0.10 
    -0.26      
 
ρ  
-0.52 -0.35 0.31 -1.00 0.00 -0.56 -0.57   -1.42  0.01   -2.51 
     -0.98     
 
ϑ 
-0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.18 0.00 -0.61 0.55   0.10   0.20   -0.17 
      0.58    
 ζ -0.14 0.42 -0.34 1.18 0.03 -0.88 0.08   1.24   -0.14   -0.39 
       1.05   
 
ς 
0.05 0.23 -0.20 -0.03 0.11 -0.06 0.20  -0.12  0.17  -0.37 
         0.10  
 
µ
-0.98 -0.24 0.37 -1.27 0.12 -1.61 -0.56  -0.96  -0.31   -6.06 
          -6.22 
Note: Values on the diagonal refer to the factor main effect. Standard errors computed with 400 bootstraps. Refe-
rence case is the low value of factors.
p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.1 
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Production technology: σ a, ζ, ρK. The main factors that affect
changes in production technology, σ α and ζ, also have a pervasive
effect, interacting with all other aspects of structural change,
except those that define changes to consumption patterns. In
particular, the relation with organisational factors is negative: for
an increase in organisational complexity—i.e. reduction in v—or
wage differences, fast changes in technology reduce output
growth. Taken together with the negative sign of the interaction
with ρ, this result suggests that rapid changes in the productivity
component of capital have a negative impact on output in the
presence of high markups, large wage differences and multiple
organisational tiers which amplify wage differences. In other
words, economies that experience fast changes in productivity
grow at a lower pace if the structure imposes as well an unequal
distribution of the productivity gains. The interaction with
product technology is negative with respect to the discovery of
new sectors, and positive with respect to changes in product
quality. Finally, the two main factors affecting changes in produc-
tion technology— σ a and ζ —are strongly and positively related to
increased output.
Organisation of production: v and b. A large number of layers
required to manage an organisation (low v) and large wage diffe-
rences (b) between these layers have a negative impact in the
presence of strong structural change in all other aspects except
those affecting income distribution, µ. Even in the presence of
rapid changes in consumption patterns, higher wage inequality
reduces output growth.
Income distribution: µ, µk. A large markup generating high
profits in our model has a negative impact under almost all aspects
of strong structural change, except for the organisational aspects
discussed above, and changes in expenditure shares.
Consumption patterns: η, ς. As already noted, the factors
determining structural changes in consumption play a minor role
in output growth. The interactions with many other aspects of
structural change are not significant: the main effects of consump-
tion patterns are visible when structural change occurs in product
technology and the distribution of income. Indeed, the emergence
of new products is a requirement for changes in consumption to
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have a role on output. The two main aspects of consumption
patterns, η and ς  interact positively.
4. Discussion and conclusions
 A large wealth of research has investigated why regions starting
from a similar level of output grow so differently through time.
Which are the initial apparently small differences that diverge so
markedly? In this paper we build on the idea that the initial diffe-
rences that determine growth divergence are those that define the
structure of an economy and the way in which this evolves
through time. We maintain that structural change occurs in diffe-
rent aspects of the economy, such as the structure of production,
consumption, labour organisation and income distribution. These
different dimensions of structural change interact in a continuous
evolutionary process, and are not independent from the growth
pattern. For example, one could not think at the industrial revolu-
tion without considering aspects such as changes in knowledge
and technology, changes in the patterns of consumption, changes
in trade patterns and extraction of resources through colonial
power, and institutional changes. In turn, changes in knowledge
and technology may be driven by changes in the demand, as well
as by changes in labour relations (e.g. increase in the cost of
labour). Similarly, changes in transportation and military techno-
logies are not independent from changes in technological
knowledge. Changes in consumption patterns are also related to
increased trade. And so on.
We propose a model of the microeconomic dynamics of struc-
tural change and their interactions, abstracting from the
institutional aspects. The model defines the following related
aspects of structural change: organisation of production, techno-
logy of production and the emergence of new sectors on the supply
side, and income distribution and consumption patterns on the
demand side. Ten different parameters (factors) in the model
account for these five dimensions of structural change.
In this paper we simply investigate the relative importance of
each aspect of structural change in economic growth. We also
acknowledge that some of these aspects are likely to have a sizeable
impact on economic growth only when complemented by other
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aspects of structural change. For example, changes in consumption
patterns may not occur if there is no change in the sectoral compo-
sition of the economy, or if there is no change in wages. We
therefore use the model to study the interaction among the diffe-
rent aspects of structural change, analysing factors' interactions.
To do so, for each of the ten parameters defining the different
aspects of structural change we assign a high and a low value,
respectively identifying large and small structural change as the
economy grows. We then define a DOE that accounts for all
possible combinations of the parameters' high and low values.
In other words, we define 210 different economies, all starting
from the same initial conditions except for one of the aspects of
structural change. On one extreme we have an economy that expe-
riences negligible structural changes in all economic aspects, and
on the other extreme an economy that experiences large structural
changes in all economic aspects. In between are all other possible
combinations. We study the impact of the five different aspects of
structural changes with an analysis of variance, and running quan-
tile regressions on the cross-design—cross-country—sample.
We find that almost all aspects of structural change are signifi-
cant determinants of the differences in the growth rate of output
across designs, but their magnitude varies substantially. Income
distribution, rate of change in production technology and the
emergence of new sectors, explain a great deal of output growth
differences, changes in consumption patterns—shares and prefe-
rences—are barely significant, and changes in the organisation of
production—organisation and compensation of labour—lay in
between. Moreover, the most relevant factors of structural change
play a determinant role even in the presence of negligible struc-
tural changes in all other economic aspects. While the opposite
case is rarely true: the output growth of economies that are set to
experience large structural changes in all aspects except for one, is
not affected if one of the changes is only negligible.
Concerning the complementarity among different aspects, we
find that most factors of structural change strongly interact. This is
an extremely relevant result suggesting that we should always
account for a large number of economic aspects to understand
long term patterns of across-countries divergence. For example, we
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find that changes in the composition of sectors available in the
market become more relevant when consumption patterns also
experience strong structural changes. Or, technological progress is
strongly relevant, but quick technological advances have a nega-
tive effect on output growth when they are accompanied by
structural changes in the organisation of labour that leads to large
inequality among a large number of emerging classes. In other
words, economies that experience fast changes in productivity,
grow at a lower pace if the structure imposes as well an unequal
distribution of the productivity gains among workers.
Taken together, the model and the analysis of the experimental
design we proposed in this article clearly show that to explain long
term growth we need to look at the way in which a large number of
structural changes interact at the microeconomic level. It is not
unlikely to find that some aspects of structural change were deter-
minant for some regions, and detrimental for others (such as the
pay structure at the beginning of the industrial revolution in
Europe). Moreover, while some of the interactions between the
different aspects are relatively known, many interactions instead
suggest avenues for future research on the relation between growth
and structural change.
For example, the results show that inequality is related to
output growth in a number of different ways through the different
aspects of structural change. This is in line with the lack of agree-
ment, on theoretical and empirical grounds, on the relation
between inequality and GDP growth (Aghion et al., 1999; Eicher
and Turnovsky, eds, 2007). In our model the effect of inequality on
output is transmitted through the aggregate demand. For example,
higher wage inequality per se increases the overall amount of
resources allocated to consumers, as well as more complex organi-
sation of firm labour (low v). But the relation between inequality
and output when we do not control for structural parameters (a
result biased by omitted variables) is negative. This correlation
simply says that in stagnating economies, due to a lack of demand,
there is no investment in capital goods and all profits are redistri-
buted to managers: low growth induces inequality. Although
institutions have no role in our model, this result is in line with the
literature that shows the relevance of elite behaviour in countries
long run development (Acemoglu et al., 2005). While an economy
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growing rapidly also generates some inequality, due to the hierar-
chical structure of firms, this same non-linear increase in vacancies
that accompanies an increase in demand generates even more
growth and demand. This is amplified by the size of wages, i.e.
consumable income. However, as noted elsewhere (Ciarli et al.,
2010), it is the overall demand that counts in our model, and not
how it is redistributed, given that we assume that all classes have
the same propensity to consume their income. Here we simply
observe that growing firms generate more demand; and different
wage classes consume a different set of goods. However, given the
minor role played by demand side factors in our model, we can
make no judgement on what would be the best way to redistribute
salaries. What seem to be essential from analysing the model dyna-
mics is the selection of firms by consumers, either because they
differentiate on price (low income) or on quality (top incomes).
And because of the pyramidal structure of the firm, the price selec-
tion by the large population of shop-floor workers seems essential
in facilitating the transition from low to exponential growth.
Finally, large profit shares in the form of large mark-up have the
opposite effect on real demand, through an increase in prices, with
a negative impact on output growth. We plan to focus more on the
relation between the different aspects of inequality and output
growth in future research, exploiting the panel structure of the
simulation data.
Among the implication for future research with this and similar
models, two limitations in the analysis of this paper suggest two
future steps. First, here we do not consider the deeper determinants
of the initial differences in the factors that determine structural
change, which are mainly related to institutional aspects—in a
broad sense—and to the intricate relation between knowledge,
technology, and institutions. In future work we want to build on
the sizeable literature that uses the case of the industrial revolu-
tion(s) to investigate the relations between knowledge,
technology, and institutions to shed more light on the origins of
the structural difference that we model here. Second, having
studied here which are the most relevant aspects in determining
the output response with a simple DOE, the next step is to focus on
those aspects and analyse whether their effect on output is linear
and monotonous, as assumed in the DOE. Previous work suggests
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that it is not (Ciarli and Lorentz, 2011; Ciarli et al., 2012). Of parti-
cular importance is the relation between the various components
of inequality, labour organisation and output growth. Moreover,
we plan to study how different aspects of structural change modify
their effect through time, exploiting the panel structure of the
data. Finally, one can exploit these same results to simplify the
model reducing the number of parameters and behavioural details.
With reference to the model presented here, we plan to simplify
purchase behaviour to a completely adaptive demand behaviour.
More in general, it seems like a good strategy to start with highly
complex agent based models, thoroughly analyse the most rele-
vant aspects with an appropriate DOE, and learn from the analysis
how to simplify the model, stylising the aspects that have little
influence on the outputs.
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Appendix
A. Experimental design
The choice of limit values
The ''Low'' and ''High'' values of the factors analysed in this
paper were chosen following three criteria: (i) the minimum or
maximum possible values (when a limit exists, such as in shares):
in this case we selected values that approximate the extremes. (ii)
We made reference to the empirical evidence, and chose values
below the minimum observed for ''Low'', and values above the
maximum observed for High. Or (iii) when the factors have been
tested in previous work (for a large number of values) we used the
values below/beyond which the factor did not show to have a
significant effect. The mix of these criteria makes the choice of the
''Low'' and ''High'' values in this paper quite robust and meanin-
gful—we do not see many other options for this type of work.
Table 7. Choice of limit values of factors
The ''Low'' and ''High'' values of the factors are chosen with respect to available empirical 
evidence and/or within theoretically possible and meaningful values.
  Factor  Low  High 
ι   Approximates the minimum 
No significant effect found above 0.2 when we 
analyse a large number of values between 0 and 
10 (Ciarli and Lorentz, 2011)
ν Minimum postulated in Lydall (1959); Simon (1957)
Far above the max postulated in Lydall (1959); 
Simon(1957) and very marginal effect observed 
beyond 15 (Ciarli et al. 2012)
b The minimum Above the maximum postulated by Lydall (1959); Simon (1957) 
σa Approximates the minimum 
Maximum valued used in Ciarli et al.( 2012): 
an extremely large number for the time frame 
postulated here 
η
Close to the minimum (to allow for 
some changes in consumption pat-
terns) 
Well beyond the theoretical maximum 
ρ = ρk Approximates the minimum share Approximates the maximum share
ϑ Approximates the minimum value 
No significant effect found above 2 when we 
analyse a large number of values between 
0 and 10 (Ciarli and Lorentz, 2011) 
ξ Close to the minimum Close to max probability (also for small level of R&D investment)
ς Approximates the minimum share Approximates the maximum share 
µ = µ K Approximates the minimum 
Well beyond observed evidence (De Loecker 
and Warzinski, 2009; Joaquim Oliveira et al., 
1996; Marchetti, 2002)
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B. Tables  
Table 8. Vector autoregression analysis of the main macro variables
Results from LADestimates of 10 periods growth rates, and bootstrapped standard errors 
(400). (1) ∆Y: output growth; (2) ∆A: Aggregate productivity (3) ∆P: price; (4) ∆IHI: inverse 
Herfindhal Index (5) ∆AT: Atkinson inequality index. The numbers in parenthesis indicate the 
number of lags 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Variables ∆Y  ∆Α    ∆P ∆IHI   ∆AT  
 
 ∆Y (1)  0.986***  -0.021**  0.014  0.189  0.247*** 
  (0.037)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.145)  (0.076) 
 ∆A (1)  0.016  0.735***  -0.045***  -0.284  -0.273* 
  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.013)  (0.237)  (0.161) 
 ∆P (1)  -0.697***  0.049  1.058***  0.718  0.165 
  (0.063)  (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.746)  (0.405) 
 ∆IHI (1)    0.010***  0.019***  -0.011***  0.624***  -0.249*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.043)  (0.026) 
 ∆AT (1)  0.020***  0.001  -0.001  0.065  0.941*** 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.049)  (0.035) 
 ∆Y (2)  0.081  0.024  -0.012  -0.384**  -0.165* 
  (0.051)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.192)  (0.088) 
 ∆A (2)  0.049*  0.044  0.025  -0.085  0.228 
  (0.026)  (0.039)  (0.017)  (0.272)  (0.228) 
 ∆P (2)  0.771***  -0.001  0.054  -1.045  -2.385*** 
  (0.092)  (0.082)  (0.072)  (0.981)  (0.690) 
 ∆IHI (2)  -0.014***  -0.026***  0.005*  0.237***  0.247*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.053)  (0.032) 
 ∆AT (2)  -0.001  0.006  -0.000  -0.032  0.013 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.057)  (0.045) 
 ∆Y (3)  -0.069**  -0.006  0.000  0.213*  -0.080 
  (0.035)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.127)  (0.052) 
 ∆A (3)  0.000  0.085***  0.005  0.138  -0.015 
  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.014)  (0.271)  (0.177) 
 ∆P (3)  -0.052  -0.083  -0.131***  0.247  2.104*** 
  (0.056)  (0.066)  (0.051)  (0.775)  (0.528) 
  ∆IHI (3)  0.006*  0.005  0.005  0.098*  -0.010 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.054)  (0.029) 
  ∆AT (3)  -0.014***  -0.008  0.002  0.018  -0.019 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.042)  (0.029) 
Constant  -0.000  0.000***  -0.000***  -0.001  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Observations  1,950  1,950  1,950  1,950  1,950 
Pseudo R2  0.98  0.61  0.84  0.71  0.67 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 9. Kruskall-Wallis rank test. Main parameter effects
   Parameter  Obs  Rank Sum  chi-squared  df  Prob
ι
   0.001  10240  1.010e+08 
 76   1  0.00
   0.3  10240  1.090e+08 
ν     
   3  10240  1.020e+08 
 34.94   1   0.00 
   50  10240  1.070e+08 
b      
   1  10240  1.030e+08 
 17.54   1   0.00 
   3  10240  1.070e+08 
σa      
   0.01  10240  9.120e+07 
 1048   1   0.00 
   0.2  10240  1.190e+08 
η      
   0.1  10240  1.060e+08 
 8.621   1  0.00 
   3  10240  1.040e+08 
ρ      
   0.05  10240  1.310e+08 
 3744   1   0.00 
   0.95  10240  7.900e+07 
ϑ      
   0.01  10240  1.030e+08 
 15.88   1   0.00
   10  10240  1.070e+08 
ξ      
   0.1  10240  9.220e+07 
 902.3   1   0.00 
   1000  10240  1.180e+08 
ς      
   0.05  10240  1.050e+08 
 0.334   1   0.56 
   0.9  10240  1.050e+08 
µ      
   1.01  10240  1.480e+08 
 10452   1   0.00 
   2  10240  6.160e+07 
